Judicial Politics and Decisionmaking: A New Approach by Guthrie, Chris et al.
Vanderbilt University Law School
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2017
Judicial Politics and Decisionmaking: A New
Approach
Chris Guthrie
Andrew J. Wistrich
U.S. District Court, Central District, CA
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Cornell Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Judges Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chris Guthrie, Andrew J. Wistrich, and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Judicial Politics and Decisionmaking: A New Approach, 70 Vanderbilt Law
Review. 2051 (2017)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/712
? ???? ?????
Citation:
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski; Andrew J. Wistrich; Chris
Guthrie, Judicial Politics and Decisionmaking: A New
Approach, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 2051  (2017)


Provided by: 
Vanderbilt University Law School
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Tue Feb  6 12:28:58 2018
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
                                     Use QR Code reader to send PDF to
                                     your smartphone or tablet device 
Judicial Politics and Decisionmaking:
A New Approach
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski*
Andrew J. Wistrich**
Chris Guthrie***
In twenty-five different experiments conducted on over 2,200
judges, we assessed whether judges' political ideology influences their
resolution of hypothetical cases. Generally, we found that the political
ideology of the judge matters, but only very little. Across a range of
bankruptcy, criminal, and civil cases, we found that the aggregate effect
of political ideology is either nonexistent or amounts to roughly one-
quarter of a standard deviation. Overall, the results of our experiments
suggest that judges are not "politicians in robes."
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INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no topic at the intersection of law and social science has
generated as much research as the influence of political attitudes on
judicial decisionmaking. 1 One would think that summarizing it would
be a nearly Herculean task, but it is actually straightforward: judicial
politics matters. 2 From Stuart Nagel's well-known comprehensive
study of the effect of politics on state and federal supreme court justices
conducted over a half century ago3 right up to the present day, study
after study finds that the political orientation of judges influences their
1. For reviews, see generally LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE
(2013); CAss R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY (2006); THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003).
2. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 22-23 (1997) (claiming
that "most justices, in most cases, pursue policy"); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Reconsidering
Judicial Preferences, 16 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 11, 24 (2013) (identifying political ideology as a
motivating factor in judicial decisions).
3. Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges'Decisions, 55 AM. POL. Scl. REV.
843 (1961).
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decisions.4 This finding is somewhat remarkable, given that many
studies use the political party of the appointing president as the
measure of political attitudes.5 The underlying effect of politics on
judges must be potent indeed if such a blunt and unreliable measure of
political attitudes can generate meaningful effects.
Despite the consistent finding that political attitudes influence
judicial decisionmaking, there is a robust and heated debate on the
topic that can nonetheless be simply summarized as follows: academics
assert that attitudes influence judicial decisionmaking, but judges
usually deny that politics matters. 6 Consider the recent testimony by
then-Judge Gorsuch in his confirmation hearings. He insisted that the
law will drive his decisions, not his politics.7 This position is hardly
unusual. When they comment at all on the social science evidence
suggesting that they are influenced by politics, judges tend to dismiss
it.8 Political scientists continue to pile on evidence that politics
influences judges, even though judges deny it.
What explains the divide between the evidence and the judges?
Several reasons suggest themselves. First, judges might possibly be
disingenuously denying the influence of their political attitudes. Like
most public officials (and perhaps more so than most given the way they
are selected and their lack of enforcement power), judges are highly
protective of the legitimacy of their institution.9 The assertion that
4. See Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-
Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 221 (1999) (compiling and analyzing research on the link between
judges' political party affiliations and judicial ideologies).
5. Some have used more complex measures. E.g., Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn,
Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-
1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002); Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The
Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005); see also Joshua
B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 133, 154-90 (2009) (comparing different methods of researching the
influence of politics on judicial decisionmaking).
6. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA
L. REV. 1335, 1336 (1998) (arguing against the position that the political views of judges affect
judicial decisions); Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the 'Politics"of Judging:
Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 625 (1985) (same).
7. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of the Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
115th Cong. (2017), https://www.jucliciary.senate.gov/meetings/nomination-of-the-honorable-neil-
m-gor [https://perma.cc/EPX2-6LBV] [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing] (responses of Judge Neil
M. Gorsuch to Questions for the Record) (asserting that his "personal views" on political issues
have no bearing on his decisionmaking as a judge).
8. Judge Richard Posner is a notable exception. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, How
JUDGES THINK 78-120 (2008) (developing the theory of judges as occasional legislators).
9. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR 63-72 (2006) (arguing that judicial decisions are influenced by judges' expectations
about how the public may receive them).
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judging is politics by another means threatens the legitimacy of the
judiciary. Second, maybe judges are reacting to the more numerous,
mostly mundane legal issues that they must decide. As then-Judge
Gorsuch asserted at his recent nomination hearing, he agreed with his
colleagues on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 97% of
the cases they decided. 10 Perhaps the law is determinate enough that
most of the time, it leaves little room for political judgment." Judges
also might incorrectly assume that political attitudes do not influence
fact finding.12 After all, the day-to-day experience of judges is that the
law is clear in most cases and they easily find consensus with colleagues
possessing different political perspectives.
The explanation that most judicial decisionmaking is
determinate applies perhaps the least to the U.S. Supreme Court.13
Judges' political attitudes might be less significant in lower court cases,
in which judges often are constrained by precedent and address less
politically contentious issues. Political scientists tend to emphasize
those close, politically charged cases decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court, rather than the ordinary disputes that occupy most judges,
thereby producing different conclusions about the influence of political
attitudes on judicial decisionmaking.
Third, perhaps the most intriguing account of the divergence
between judges and the academy, is that judges might be oblivious to
the role that politics plays in their decisionmaking processes. Judges
perhaps feel that they "call them like they seem them," to use Chief
Justice Roberts' umpire metaphor. 14 Their attitudes and beliefs affect
10. Confirmation Hearing, supra note 7 (statement of Judge Neil M. Gorsuch) ("My law clerks
tell me that ninety-seven percent of the 2,700 cases I've decided were decided unanimously. And
that I have been in the majority ninety-nine percent of the time.").
11. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 49-50 ("The two moderate judicial schools [legalism and
pragmatism] may come close enough to enable most cases in the open area to be disposed of with
minimum disagreement.").
12. See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009)
(showing how political attitudes can influence how individuals interpret video evidence). But see
Dan M. Kahan et al., "Ideology" or "Situation Sense"? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated
Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 410-12 (2016) [hereinafter Kahan
et al., An Experimental Investigation] (finding that judges do not show similar effects of political
influence).
13. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED 312-25 (2002) (arguing for a predictive model of Supreme Court voting based
on Justices' political attitudes); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the
Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 557, 561-62 (1989) (correlating
political values of Supreme Court Justices with votes in civil rights cases).
14. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 31 (2005)
(discussing the role Supreme Court Justices take in upholding the ideal of unbiased judgment).
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how they see facts, respond to arguments, and understand the law, but
perhaps all of that operates in a way that is invisible to them. In effect,
judges are what psychologists call naive realists, 15 who believe they see
the world through a clear lens, unaffected by political beliefs.16 From
other research, we have found that judges, like most professionals,
suffer from egocentric bias, in which they hold unrealistic views of their
capacity to avoid corrosive influences on their judgment." For example,
we found that 97% of judges believe that they are better able than their
median colleague in avoiding the influence of race and gender bias.18
Maybe judges simply mistakenly believe that they are immune to
political influence.
The tension between judges and political scientists ultimately
boils down to who is right: Do judges' political attitudes influence their
judgment or not? Although the literature on politics and judging is
voluminous, virtually all of it shares a common methodological
approach: analyzing judicial decisions in actual cases. 19 Decisions in
actual cases are what we all care about the most, but studies of actual
cases carry an inherent limitation. Cases vary. A Republican judge
declares a gun-control ordinance to be a violation of Second Amendment
rights in Texas while a Democratic judge in Illinois declares a similar
ordinance to be acceptable. The difference could be attributable to
politics, but the difference could also be attributable to variations
between the two ordinances or other circumstances. Facts matter, and
judges can rightly argue that no two cases are truly alike.
15. See Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social
Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103, 110-11 (Edward S. Reed, Elliot
Turiel & Terrance Brown eds., 1996) (describing the theory of naive realism).
16. See Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt & Daniel Osherson, False Consensus Bias in
Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268, 1291-94 (2008) (empirically demonstrating the
false consensus bias, a cognitive bias related to naive realism, in judges).
17. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 813-15 (2001).
18. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The "Hidden Judiciary": An
Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1519 (2009).
19. See Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2017, 2036-38 (2016) (describing the data that forms the basis for most empirical work on
judicial behavior). A notable exception is a study by Dan Kahan and his colleagues. See Kahan et
al., An Experimental Investigation, supra note 12. This study shows that judges-unlike
laypeople-do not rely on their cultural commitments in assessing one legal scenario. Inasmuch
as cultural commitments are akin to political beliefs, this study suggests that judges might not
rely on political attitudes in making decisions. The result, however, is suspect because the authors
used only a single scenario and found that most of the judges decided the scenario the same way.
A scenario that more deeply divided the judges might thus have produced different results. For a
related experimental study of political ideology in judges, see Richard E. Redding & N. Dickon
Reppucci, Effects of Lawyers' Socio-political Attitudes on Their Judgments of Social Science in
Legal Decision Making, 23 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 31 (1999).
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Political scientists are well aware of this problem, and they
address it in clever and interesting ways. Judges who serve on
multimember courts (including the Supreme Court) often hear the same
case, and some scholars take advantage of that fact.20 But no one case
can provide enough statistical power to identify the influence of politics
definitively, so political scientists must inevitably combine different
cases. Furthermore, panels of judges do not decide trials in the United
States, and so this method is not available for the very types of cases
that are both the most common and least likely to involve a political
question (trial court decisions). There are exceptions,21 but they are
rare. More commonly, researchers try to control for variations in case
characteristics with multiple regression analysis. Although this
technique is standard practice in the social sciences (and sensibly so),
any unobserved parameter can undermine the results.
This Article assesses the influence of politics on judges in a
different way. We have collected data on thousands of sitting state and
federal judges in the United States for nearly twenty years using
controlled experiments. 22 We present judges with a single hypothetical
case so that large numbers of judges respond to the same situation. We
have collected this data for other purposes, but we commonly ask judges
participating in our research to identify their political orientation. This
methodology enables us to examine how judges with different political
affiliations evaluate the same case. Because most of our studies involve
trial judges rather than appellate judges, we also can shed some light
on the very kinds of decisions that judges say are both the least
vulnerable to the influence of politics and are also the most common.
This Article summarizes what we have learned about judges and
politics through our experimental methods. We present results
involving civil and criminal cases reviewed by over 2,200 judges,
including federal district judges, federal magistrate judges, federal
bankruptcy judges, trial judges from nine states, and judges from
multiple states attending national conferences. Our results suggest
that politics has only a modest influence on trial judges. We find that
politics has an impact on judges' decisions in only a few of our
20. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En
Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 243-44 (1999) (describing how judges on the same court
disagree over cases along political lines).
21. Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the
Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1410 (1998)
("[W]e had the opportunity to study legal reasoning in action through written opinions authored
or joined by 188 judges, all resolving the same legal problem.").
22. See generally Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Implicit Bias in Judicial
Decision Making: How It Affects Judgment and What Judges Can Do About It, in ENHANCING
JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS 87 (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017) (describing our research).
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hypothetical cases, but when we aggregate across scenarios (as political
scientists do in their research), we do find a pattern of political
influence. Although we conclude that political attitudes influence
judges, the effect of political influence is sufficiently small that trial
judges likely do not notice it in their day-to-day decisionmaking. This
finding might explain at least some of the disagreement between judges
and political scientists concerning the influence of political attitudes on
judges' rulings.
I. METHODOLOGY
We collected the data described in this Article during
presentations made by one or more of us at judicial education programs.
We have presented to over five thousand judges in eighteen different
states (including numerous federal courts) and three countries. We
begin these presentations by asking the judges to respond to a written
questionnaire containing three to five hypothetical scenarios or tests.23
These materials have provided the data for numerous publications that
investigate various psychological aspects of judicial decisionmaking. 24
Most of our presentations are during plenary programs rather
than parallel sessions and at many of them, most of the judges in the
relevant jurisdiction attend. Furthermore, we use presentation titles
that are vague (such as "judicial decisionmaking") so as not to reveal
what our research involves before the judges respond to the
questionnaire. Hence, the judges are attending an educational program
on judging, rather than attending a session on psychological aspects of
decisionmaking.
We usually also ask the judges to provide demographic
information, such as gender, political affiliation, years of judicial
experience, and sometimes race. We never ask the judges to identify
themselves. We also give judges the opportunity to complete the survey
for pedagogic purposes, but to opt out of allowing us to use their
questionnaire in any further research. Nearly all of the judges who have
attended our presentations complete the voluntary survey and have
authorized us to use their results in the research described below. The
few who opted out have been excluded from the analysis.
We measure judges' political orientations based on the judges'
responses to the following question: "Which of the two major political
parties in the United States most closely matches your own political
23. Guthrie et al., supra note 17, at 816-18 (describing our methodology).
24. See generally Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 22 (reviewing our research).
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beliefs?" 25 We preferred this question to alternatives, inasmuch as it is
intended to elicit their underlying political attitudes. Even judges who
avoid joining a political party may be able to answer to this question.
Nevertheless, some judges do not answer the question, or give an
equivocal response such as "neither." These amount to less than 5% of
the judges we questioned. We include in our analysis only responses
from judges align themselves with one of the two major parties.
We have presented judges with a wide range of legal scenarios,
largely designed to identify the influence of various psychological
phenomena. In this paper, we instead concentrate on the influence of
the judges' political orientation on their decisions.
We have selected certain scenarios for the present analysis
based on several criteria. First, we could only use data from judges
whom we asked to identify their political orientation. Second, except
with respect to the bankruptcy judges, we limit our analysis to data that
we have previously published for other purposes. Third, we use only
scenarios that arguably implicate politics in meaningful ways.
Scenarios in which we requested that judges impose traffic fines, for
example, or make rulings in civil cases between businesses, are unlikely
to turn on judges' political attitudes, so we have excluded them. 2 6 This
left us with twenty-five scenarios involving responses from 2,209 judges
(some of whom responded to multiple scenarios). 27
25. We used this question consistently except for federal district judges. We instead asked
these judges to identify the party of the president who appointed them. Our method is thus most
closely akin to Nagel's research, which used judges' self-reported party affiliations as reflected in
judicial directories. Nagel, supra note 3, at 843.
26. These limitations caused us to omit much of our research on administrative law judges
because the questions we posed to them were not politically salient. See generally Guthrie et al.,
supra note 18, at 1492-94 (discussing research methods exploring the decisionmaking of
administrative law judges). For example, we omitted studies in which we requested that judges
review a residential rental agreement, id. at 1506-09, and impose a fine on a restaurant for a
health code violation, id. at 1516-18.
27. The data from this research has been published in a form focused on the psychological
phenomena we have studied in the following publications: Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J.
Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Altering Attention in Adjudication, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1586 (2013)
[hereinafter Rachlinski et al., Attention]; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris
Guthrie, Can Judges Make Reliable Numeric Judgments? Distorted Damages and Skewed
Sentences, 90 IND. L.J. 695 (2015) [hereinafter Rachlinski et al., Numeric Judgments]; Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Contrition in the Courtroom: Do Apologies Affect
Adjudication?, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1189 (2013) [hereinafter Rachlinski et al., Contrition]; Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1195 (2009) [hereinafter Rachlinski et al., Unconscious Bias]; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie
& Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227 (2006)
[hereinafter Rachlinski et al., Bankruptcy]; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris
Guthrie, Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 72 (2011)
[hereinafter Rachlinski et al., Hindsight Bias]; Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris
Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV.
855 (2015).
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We have divided the analysis into different types of cases. First,
we assess the influence of politics on bankruptcy judges. In bankruptcy
cases, we predict that Democrats will generally be more favorable to
debtors and Republicans to creditors. Second, we examine our studies
involving criminal issues, breaking the studies into ones involving
pretrial motions, conviction decisions, and sentencing. We predict that
Democrats will be more favorable to criminal defendants while
Republicans will tend to favor the police or the prosecution. Third, we
analyze civil cases, predicting that Democrats will award more in
damages to injured plaintiffs than Republicans.
II. BANKRUPTCY JUDGES
Having previously found that political attitudes have a large
effect on decisionmaking among bankruptcy judges, 28 we begin with
them. Given the relatively more probusiness attitude of Republicans,
along with a greater concern with holding individuals personally
responsible for their actions, Republicans might be expected to favor
creditors. And indeed, we previously concluded that "Republican judges
were more likely than their Democratic counterparts to make decisions
that favored creditors." 29 We analyze these results further here, along
with some more recent data.
Federal bankruptcy judges are appointed by court of appeals
judges after being vetted by merit selection panels, serving for fourteen-
year renewable terms.30 Their jurisdiction is largely limited to
bankruptcy cases and civil matters closely related to the adjudication
of bankruptcy claims.31 Our initial sample of 113 bankruptcy judges
consisted of judges attending a session at a conference sponsored by the
Federal Judicial Center in August 2004, in Seattle, Washington. At the
time, this group comprised roughly one-third of all then sitting
bankruptcy judges. Our subsequent sample consisted of 201 bankruptcy
judges who attended one of two conferences at which we presented in
2013 in San Diego and New Orleans. Virtually all of the sitting
bankruptcy judges attended one of these two conferences, and most of
those attended one of our sessions (57% of all sitting bankruptcy judges
28. Rachlinski et al., Bankruptcy, supra note 27, at 1258 ("In our study, the Republican
judges were more likely than their Democratic counterparts to make decisions that favored
creditors.").
29. Id.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2012).
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (explaining that federal bankruptcy judges may hear and
determine all cases and all core proceedings arising under the Title 11 Bankruptcy Code).
2017] 2059
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are represented in this sample32). The demographics of the bankruptcy
judges, along with all other judges in this study, are described in
Appendix A.
As with all of our research, the scenarios that were presented to
the judges were not designed to assess the influence of their political
attitudes, but other aspects of judging. In our initial published study of
bankruptcy judges, the judges read five scenarios that required judges
to favor either a creditor or debtor (the others requested different kinds
of rulings and were hence not relevant to our hypothesis). 33 We report
three of them here. Political attitudes had no effect on the judges in one
of the scenarios, but this was likely because the decision in that scenario
was too obvious. 34 More recently we asked bankruptcy judges to respond
to two scenarios involving personal bankruptcy (described below) that
also involved a creditor versus a debtor, and also used scenarios that
induced more variation among the judges.
A. Cramdown
In one scenario we asked the judges to set an interest rate on a
restructured loan ina Chapter 13 proceeding. 35 In creating the scenario,
we took advantage of a then-recent Supreme Court opinion, Till v. SCS
Credit Corp.36 In Till, the Court held that in restructuring a secured
loan in a Chapter 13 wage-earner plan, bankruptcy courts should use
the prime rate as the starting point and then adjust upwards by
considering the opportunity costs of the loan, the risk of inflation, and
the risk of default. 37 We gave judges a scenario involving a truck driver
who owned his own rig and filed for bankruptcy. We asked judges to
reset his interest payment based on the methodology mandated by Till.
We used this scenario to test the influence of numeric reference
points (anchoring). Half of the judges were given an initial interest rate
(21%), while the other half were not given an initial interest rate. Even
though Till declared the initial interest rate to be irrelevant, we found
32. Wistrich et al., supra note 27, at 887.
33. Rachlinski et al., Bankruptcy, supra note 27, at 1258 (summarizing research findings by
political attitude of the judges).
34. The other two scenarios requested that judges identify their willingness to discharge
specific debt on a six-point scale. While relevant to our inquiry, these two scenarios suffered from
ceiling effects. In one of them virtually all of the judges indicated a willingness to discharge the
debt, and in the other an unwillingness to do so. Rachlinski et al., Bankruptcy, supra note 27, at
1231-32 (describing this group of participating judges).
35. Id. at 1233-37.
36. 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
37. Id. at 478-79.
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that it influenced judges' determinations, consistent with research on
anchoring.38
The responses also revealed a difference based on political
orientation. As Table 1A shows, the Republican judges set an average
interest rate of 7.4%, while the Democratic judges set an average rate
of 6.5%. This difference was marginally statistically significant. 39 The
higher interest rate favored the creditor (a bank) over the debtor (an
individual truck driver who owned his own business).
TABLE 1A: AVERAGE INTEREST RATE BY PARTY AND CONDITION (AND N)
Condition Republicans Democrats
No Interest Rate Provided 6.4% (8) 6.3% (42)
Interest Rate Provided 7.9% (16) 6.7% (34)
Total 7.4% (24) 6.5% (76)
B. Student Loan
We created a second bankruptcy scenario designed to examine
the role that the race of the debtor might play in the discretionary
discharge decisions that judges make. 40 In the scenario, the bankruptcy
judges learned that a debtor, a young woman, had filed for bankruptcy
protection to have her student loan debt discharged. The judges learned
that the debtor had completed three years of college, borrowing $23,000
per year to attend. She dropped out at the end of her junior year due to
an unexpected pregnancy and the subsequent birth of her son. To
support herself and her son, the debtor took an $18,000 per year job as
a sales clerk, and her grandmother provided child care for her baby. The
materials described her monthly expenses, apart from the repayment
of her student loan, as amounting to $1,125. Recently, however, her
grandmother had fallen ill and could no longer provide child care while
she was at work. Thus, the debtor incurred new child-care expenses,
which made it difficult, if not impossible, to manage her monthly
38. The 54 judges in the control group set an average interest rate of 6.33%, while the 49
judges in the anchor group set a mean interest rate of 7.13%. Rachlinski et al., Bankruptcy, supra
note 27, at 1235.
39. t(98) = 1.82, p = 0.07. The judges' political party did not interact with the effect of the
anchor. ANOVA with main effects of party and anchoring condition, and their interaction revealed
that the interaction was not significant. F(1, 96) = 0.93, p = 0.33.
40. Rachlinski et al., Bankruptcy, supra note 27, at 1245-48.
2017] 2061
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
expenses, including the $600 payment on her $83,748 consolidated
student loan.
The materials reminded the judges that educational loans are
not dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code absent a showing of
"undue hardship."41 The Code does not define "undue hardship," but
nearly every circuit requires a debtor seeking the discharge of a student
loan to satisfy a three-part test: (1) the debtor cannot maintain a
minimal standard of living for herself and her dependents if required to
repay the loan; (2) additional circumstances exist suggesting this is
likely to remain the case throughout a significant portion of the
repayment period; and (3) the debtor has made good-faith efforts to
repay the loan.4 2
We asked the judges to assume "for purposes of this problem"
that they serve in "a circuit that allows bankruptcy judges the option of
considering a partial discharge of educational loan debt." We then
asked: "Based on the 'undue hardship' test enunciated above and the
facts as given, what dollar amount of Student's loan amount would you
discharge (please pick a dollar amount between $0 and $83,748)?"
To manipulate the race of the debtor, we identified the debtor
using one of eighteen different female first names.4 3 To reinforce the
race of the debtor, we used the name eight times in the scenario. We
found no impact based on race, 44 but we did find a statistically
significant impact based on the political ideology of the judges.4 5
Democratic judges were much more forgiving than their Republican
counterparts. Democratic judges discharged an average of $50,972,
while Republican judges discharged an average of $34,232. By
discharging more of the debt, the Democratic judges favored the debtor
as against her creditors relative to the Republican judges.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012).
42. Rachlinski et al., Bankruptcy, supra note 27, at 1247 (describing the tests for "undue
hardship").
43. The African American-sounding names were Ebony, Latonya, Kenya, Latoya, Tanisha,
Lakisha, Tamika, Keisha, and Aisha. The white-sounding names were Kristen, Carrie, Laurie,
Meredith, Sarah, Allison, Jill, Anne, and Emily. Id.
44. "The judges who assessed the debtors with African American-sounding names discharged
a mean of $47,106 (or 56.2%), while the judges who assessed the debtors with white-sounding
names discharged a mean of $48,506 (or 57.9%)." Id. That difference was not statistically
significant. Id.
45. t(100) = 2.41, p = 0.02. The judges' political affiliation did not interact with the race of the
debtor significantly. ANOVA with main effects of party and race, and their interaction revealed
that the interaction was not significant. F(1, 98) = 0.19, p = 0.66.
[Vol. 70:6:20512062
2017] JUDICIAL POLITICS AND DECISIONMAKING
TABLE 1B: AVERAGE DEBT ABSOLVED BY POLITICS
AND RACE OF DEBTOR (AND N)
Race of Debtor Republicans Democrats
White $34,078 (16) $54,095 (35)
African American $34,812 (8) $48,431 (43)
Total $34,323 (24) $50,972 (78)
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C. Credit Card Debt
In an effort to measure the role of apologies and emotion in
judicial decisionmaking we gave bankruptcy judges a scenario involving
a debtor who had filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code to have all of his debt discharged, including the balance owed on
a new credit card. 46 The bank holding the credit card debt opposed the
discharge, arguing that the debtor had run up the charges knowing that
he could not pay them off, so that discharging the credit card debt would
facilitate the commission of a fraud.47 The materials identified the
debtor as a single, twenty-nine-year-old who had struggled with debt
for much of his adult life. He had never earned more than the minimum
wage, had been delinquent in making credit card payments, and had
once been evicted for nonpayment of rent. Fortunately, he had recently
landed a job, but he lost it when he almost immediately took a trip, even
though his new employer had warned him that he would be fired if he
went. During the trip, he ran up '$3,276 in charges on a credit card he
had recently obtained. The debtor had essentially no assets, had
consulted attorneys about filing for bankruptcy in the past, and had
filed for bankruptcy about three months after returning from the trip.
We gave versions of this scenario to bankruptcy judges on two
separate occasions: in 2004 along with the two scenarios described
above, and in 2013 along with the scenario described below. In 2004, we
were interested in whether an apology would influence the judges. 48 We
asked the judges whether they would be likely to discharge the debt on
a six-point scale, ranging from "very likely" to "very unlikely." We
46. Rachlinski et al., Contrition, supra note 27, at 1214-16; Wistrich et al., supra note 27, at
887-90.
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012) (exempting from discharge a debt obtained by "false
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud").
48. Rachlinski et al., Contrition, supra note 27, at 1214-16.
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varied whether the debtor appeared in court and apologized for his
reckless spending.49 The apology had no effect on the judges.50
In 2013, we altered the scenario to study the effect of emotion on
judges.5 1 We created four conditions, meant to test for two effects. Half
of the judges read a version of the scenario in which the debtor had
incurred the credit card debt during a vacation to Florida for "spring
break," where he charged his hotel room, meals, and rounds of drinks
for friends on his new credit card. The other half of the judges read a
version of the scenario in which the debtor had incurred the credit card
debt during a visit to his mother in Florida. His mother, the judges were
told, was battling cancer, lacked health insurance, and needed
assistance recovering from a recent surgery. The credit card charges
were for the cost of the trip and the mother's medicine. We also varied
the gender of the debtor. Half of the judges in each condition were told
that the debtor was Janice, while the other half were told that the
debtor was Jared. In this variation, we only asked for a binary decision
as to whether the judges would discharge the debt or not (rather than
using a six-point scale). Overall, gender did not affect the judges, but
the reason for the trip had a large effect; the more sympathetic debtor
was more likely to obtain discharge of the debt.52
In the first (apology) version of the scenario, political party had
no effect. The twenty-four Republicans and eighty-one Democrats both
rated their willingness to discharge the debt at an average of 4.42 on
the six-point scale (with six being very unlikely to discharge). The
judges' political attitudes also did not interact significantly with
whether the debtor had apologized.53
In the second (emotion) version of the scenario, Republican and
Democratic judges did not differ much in their reactions. Among the
137 Democrats, 42% favored discharge, as compared to 39% among the
41 Republican judges. The difference was not significant. 54 Although
Table IC shows a trend in which Republicans made fewer favorable
rulings for the female debtor than the male debtor (a trend not present
among the Democrats), political party did not interact significantly with
any variation in the identity of the debtor.55
49. Id. at 1214-15.
50. Id. at 1215.
51. Wistrich et al., supra note 27, at 888.
52. Id. at 889.
53. ANOVA of the judges' evaluations with main effects of condition and party revealed no
significant interaction. F(1, 101) = 0.08, p = 0.78).
54. Fisher's Exact Test, p = 0.85.
55. Logistic regression of the decision on condition, gender, party, and all interaction revealed
no significant effect of any interaction with party (zs < 0.40, p's > 0.70).
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TABLE 1C: PERCENT DISCHARGING DEBT BY POLITICS, SOURCE OF
DEBT, AND GENDER OF DEBTOR (AND N)
Debtor Republicans Democrats
Vacation Male 43% (7) 33% (27)
Female 17% (12) 28% (36)
Total 26% (19) 30% (63)
Sick Male 71% (7) 51% (39)
Mother
Female 40% (15) 51% (35)
Total 50% (22) 51% (74)
Total 39% (41) 42% (137)
D. Personal Bankruptcy
As part of a second effort to assess whether the race of debtors
might influence judges, we replicated a study conducted using
bankruptcy lawyers as research participants. Braucher and her
coauthors found that lawyers tend to suggest that individual debtors
file in Chapter 13, rather than Chapter 7, when those debtors are
African American, as opposed to white.5 6 The scenario described a
married couple with a mortgage on a house that is under water. The
wife lost her job and the couple fell behind on bills and the mortgage.
The question asked whether the lawyer would advise filing in Chapter
7 (which would give them a fresh start) or in Chapter 13 (which would
require them to continue paying some of their obligations-and hence
favors creditors more than Chapter 7). The couple was identified either
as African American or as white. The couple also expressed a preference
for either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, thereby creating a 2 x 2 design.
Results among bankruptcy lawyers indicate that they are more likely
to suggest the procreditor Chapter 13 for African American couples, and
in particular, to disregard the preferences of the African American
couple.5 7 We did not find similar results among the judges.
56. Jean Braucher, Dov Cohen & Robert M. Lawless, Race, Attorney Influence, and
Bankruptcy Chapter Choice, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 393, 400-02 (2012).
57. Id. at 411-12.
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The scenario produced a small difference between judges of
different parties. Among the Republican judges, 56% (23 out of 41)
indicated that they would advise the couple to file in Chapter 13, as
compared to only 43% (59 out of 138) of the Democratic judges. In effect,
Democrats were more apt to advise the debtors to take a course of action
that would resolve all of their debts, rather than try to pay them. This
difference is consistent with the political rhetoric of personal
responsibility among Republicans, but it was not statistically
significant.58 Political attitudes did not interact with race, debtor
preferences, or both combined.59
TABLE 1D: PERCENT RECOMMENDING CHAPTER 13 BY POLITICS, RACE
OF DEBTOR, AND DEBTOR PREFERENCE (AND N)
Debtor & Preference Republicans Democrats
African Chapter 7 50% (8) 47% (30)
American
Chapter 13 45% (11) 48% (42)
Total 47% (19) 47% (72)
White Chapter 7 63% (8) 31% (36)
Chapter 13 64% (14) 47% (30)
Total 64% (22) 38% (66)
Total 56% (41) 43% (138)
E. Summary of Bankruptcy Judges
The result we reported in our initial study of bankruptcy judges,
relying on the first two experiments, concluded that their political
attitudes influenced their decisions more than other judges.60 Our more
recent data undermines that conclusion. Among our five scenarios, only
the two we initially reported demonstrated clear effects.
58. Fisher's Exact Test, p = 0.15.
59. Logistic regression of the decision on party, race, preference, and interaction revealed no
significant effects of party (z = 0.1 7 , p = 0.86) or any interaction term (Zs < 1.10, p's > 0.25).
60. Rachlinski et al., Bankruptcy, supra note 27, at 1258.
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TABLE 1E: AVERAGE RESULTS AMONG BANKRUPTCY JUDGES BY PARTY
AND SCENARIO (AND N)
Scenario Republican Democrat Republican p- Cohen's
Minus value d*
Democrat*
Cramdown 7.4% (24) 6.5% (76) 0.9% 0.07 0.37
interest
Student loan $34k (24) $51k (78) $17k 0.02 0.41
discharged
amount
Credit card 4.42 (24) 4.42 (81) 0.00 0.99 0.00
vl**
Credit card 39% (41) 42% (137) 3 0.85 0.07
v2
discharge)
Personal 56% (41) 43% (138) 13 0.15 0.29
bankruptcy
discharge)
* A positive number indicates that Republicans favored creditors more than
Democrats.
** Six-point scale with 6 meaning "very unlikely to discharge"
When we aggregate results across the five studies using a
standard measure of effect size (Cohen's d), we find that politics plays
a small but noticeable role in influencing bankruptcy judges.
Republicans were more procreditor in four of the five scenarios (the
other being a tie), amounting to a difference of roughly one-fifth of a
standard error. 61
61. The Cohen's d for the five studies was 0.37, 0.41, 0.00, 0.07, and 0.29, respectively. A
combination weighted by sample size yields a Cohen's d of 0.22. Cohen's d is a standardized
measure of the size of the influence a relevant parameter (in this case political attitude) has on a
target parameter (in this case judges' decisions). See Christopher J. Ferguson, An Effect Size
Primer: A Guide for Clinicians and Researchers, 40 PROF. PSYCHOL. 532, 533 (2009) (labeling
Cohen's d as "the most commonly used measure" of effect size). It consists of a fraction of the
2017] 2067
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The fact that we used different scenarios in the more recent sets
of data complicates interpretation of the divergent results. The data
were collected nearly a decade apart, so it is possible that the political
climate had evolved. The first set of data was collected during the
pendency of bankruptcy reform, culminating in the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,62 which included
several provisions favorable to creditors.63 Additionally, the initial data
were collected during a Republican administration and the more recent
set during a Democratic one. These data thus might have been collected
in a different political climate among the bankruptcy judges than the
more recent data. This difference might explain why we initially
concluded that political attitudes have a large influence on bankruptcy
judges but could not replicate that effect in more recent research. That
said, one of the three scenarios that we presented in 2004 also failed to
demonstrate any effect of political attitudes on judges.
Placing the differences in the political climate for bankruptcy
judges aside, the overall effect of political attitudes on bankruptcy
judges across all of the data appears to be modest. Politics sometimes
matters to these judges, but not consistently so.
III. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1: PRETRIAL MOTIONS
We have conducted dozens of studies of general jurisdiction
judges using criminal justice scenarios, probing for a wide range of
phenomena. These studies have spanned many areas of law and have
asked several questions calling for judgments involving criminal justice
issues, including pretrial motions (particularly probable cause
determinations), guilt determinations, and criminal sentencing.
Democrats identify with the rights of criminal defendants more than
Republicans, 64 which could translate into differences in how judges
natural deviation one observes in observed data. Id. ("Cohen's d is a rather simple statistical
expression, namely the difference between two group outcomes divided by the population standard
deviation."). See generally, JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
(1969). Social scientists, by rough convention, tend to treat a Cohen's d of one-fifth of a standard
deviation as a small effect. See Jacob Cohen, A Power Primer, 92 PSYCHOL. BULL. 155, 157 (1992)
(identifying Cohen's d effect sizes of 0.20, 0.50, and 0.80 as small, medium, and large, respectively).
62. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
63. See Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of
Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 352-53 (2008) (reviewing the procreditor provisions of
the Act).
64. See Maurice Chammah, Two Parties, Two Platforms on Criminal Justice, MARSHALL
PROJECT (July 18, 2016, 9:51 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/07/18/two-parties-
two-platforms-on-criminal-justice [https://perma.ce/9RDL-C23U] (comparing the Republican and
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react to motions involving the admissibility of critical evidence in
criminal cases.
A. Probable Cause Determinations
In a series of studies involving nearly one thousand trial judges
we investigated whether judges are subject to the hindsight bias in
probable cause determinations using four different scenarios. 65 In these
cases, we compared the rulings of judges on a request for a search
warrant (foresight) with the rulings of judges on a suppression motion
concerning evidence collected without a warrant (hindsight). In both
conditions, we asked the judges to determine whether probable cause
existed. The facts were identical in both versions, except that in the
hindsight version the police uncovered incriminating evidence. If, as is
required, judges disregard the fruits of the search, they should make
the same judgments in foresight as in hindsight. We found-to our
surprise-that they were able to do so.
The details of the scenarios are described elsewhere.66 In all
cases, the search involved an unoccupied automobile because the police
can generally search an unoccupied car without obtaining a warrant.
Brief details of the scenarios (and the judges who evaluated them) are
listed below.67
1. Rock Concert. The scenario described a police officer on patrol
in a parking lot outside a large arena hosting a rock concert. The
materials indicated that the officer noticed a well-dressed, nervous-
looking man exit a BMW and fiddle with something in the trunk of his
car. The man then met a friend, bought tickets to the event, and entered
the arena. Thirty minutes later, the officer noticed that one of the
BMW's windows was rolled down. Concerned that the car might be
burglarized, he approached the car to close the window. Upon arriving
at the car, the officer stated that he smelled burnt methamphetamine.
He looked inside the car and saw some Visine, a local map, and a couple
of empty beer cans. For half of the judges, the officer requested a
warrant and for the other half, he conducted a search that produced
incriminating evidence. We gave this scenario to 130 trial judges in
Ohio attending their annual statewide judicial education conference in
2009, asking whether they believed probable cause was present.
Democratic party platforms, revealing that Republicans are strongly more pro "law and order"
than Democrats).
65. Rachlinski et al., Hindsight Bias, supra note 27, at 72.
66. Id. at 79-93.
67. Some of the scenarios were given to judges from whom we did not request political
affiliation. These judges are excluded from the analysis.
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2. Injured Driver. The materials described the response of a law
enforcement officer upon receiving word that another officer had been
attacked nearby late at night. The perpetrator had also been injured in
the attack. The materials stated that the officer observed a driver with
a bandaged hand emerge from a car parked in front of a nearby
nightclub. The driver "opened the back door, pulled out a long, curved
piece of metal from the seat, . . . placed it into the trunk of the car," and
then walked into a nightclub. The officer then walked over to the car,
and noticed that "the front left tire was a small, temporary tire of the
type used as a spare," which "made him realize that the metal object
was likely a crowbar." Upon looking into the back seat, the officer
"observed a car jack on the floor and three envelopes on the back seat,
two of which appeared to be stuffed with cash." The officer also
"observed a stain, possibly from blood, on the steering wheel." The
officer then either requested a warrant or searched the car and found
evidence incriminating the defendant in the earlier attack. We asked
the judges to determine whether probable cause was present.
In this study, we also varied the severity of the crime. For half
of the judges, the attack was said to be serious, but the officer who had
been attacked would recover. For the other half, the materials indicated
that the officer had been killed in the attack.
The underlying facts that produced the attack are identical; the
only difference is that in one case, the attack was fatal. Hence, the
judges reviewed either a battery or a murder of an officer. We gave this
scenario to three groups of trial judges: 81 U.S. district judges, 43 U.S.
magistrate judges, and 101 Florida state trial judges. We asked the
judges to determine whether probable cause was present.
3. Fleeing Suspect. The materials for the third scenario described
a police officer who was "on foot patrol in a high-crime urban area when
he noticed a car parked in front of a fire hydrant in front of a bar known
to be frequented by drug dealers." 68 The officer saw the driver "fiddle
with something in his hand as he sat in the driver's seat with the door
open." The materials stated that when the driver approached, "a
woman, who had been hanging around the entrance to the bar, looked
over at him and yelled out, 'look out Dan, it's a cop!'" The driver and
the woman ran off and escaped. The materials then stated that the
officer looked into the car and saw "an envelope on the floor by the
driver's side that had some money in it" along with "a plastic shopping
bag from a nearby Walgreens that appeared to have three packages of
pseudoephedrine in it" and "some Visine eye drops and a package of
68. Rachlinski et al., Hindsight Bias, supra note 27, at 89.
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baggies on the back seat." The materials noted that "pseudoephedrine
is often used to manufacture methamphetamine." For half of the judges,
the officer requested a warrant, and for the other half, he conducted a
search that produced incriminating evidence. We gave this scenario to
154 state trial judges in Florida. We asked the judges to determine
whether probable cause was present.
Notwithstanding the null result on the hindsight bias, we
analyzed these materials to determine whether Republicans are more
likely to grant a warrant (or admit evidence) than Democrats. We
present the results in Table 2A, below.
TABLE 2A: PERCENT CONCLUDING THAT THE FACTS SUPPORTED A
PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION BY PARTY, SCENARIO, AND
CONDITION (FORESIGHT VERSUS HINDSIGHT) (AND N)
% Finding Probable Republican p-value Cohen's d
Scenario Perspectiv Cause Minus (Fisher's (positive if
e (and n) by Party Democrat Exact Republican
Republican Democrat Test) >Democrat)
1. Foresight 18% (22) 29% (38) -11 0.13 -0.34
Parked Hindsight 27% (22) 31% (36) -4 0.57 -0.11
Car
2a. Foresight 60% (30) 46% (28) 14 0.43 0.31
Injured, Hindsight 58% (19) 38% (29) 20 0.24 0.44
Battery
2b. Foresight 64% (28) 54% (24) 10 0.57 0.23
Injured, Hindsight 67% (24) 62% (26) 5 0.77 0.12
Murder
3. Foresight 50% (36) 33% (18) 17 0.38 0.39
Fleeing Hindsight 59% (29) 53% (30) 6 0.79 0.13
Suspect III
No clear pattern or influence of politics emerged from these data.
Republican and Democratic judges made roughly the same decisions on
probable cause. We found no significant trends in any condition, and
the first scenario shows the reverse of what typical assumptions about
the attitudes of the major political parties would predict. Although
Democrats were somewhat less likely to rule against the defendant in
most of the scenarios, the difference was small. Likewise, the combined
effect size (using Cohen's d) weighted by sample size was also small
(0.14). In short, political attitudes do not appear to influence judges'
probable cause determinations.
B. Search and Seizure
In an effort to determine whether judges would respond to
emotional aspects of a case, we asked judges to rule on the admissibility
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of evidence in a search-and-seizure case.69 We described a criminal case
against a maintenance worker in a ferryboat terminal run by the
Department of Transportation. The defendant had failed a random test
for the use of illicit drugs and a subsequent search found illicit drugs in
his locker. For half of the judges, the substance was two marijuana
cigarettes; for the other half, it was $15,000 worth of heroin and "a list
of contacts at a local high school." The defendant contended that he
could not be subjected to random drug tests under Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives Association,70 which held that only employees in
safety sensitive positions are subject to random screening without a
warrant. The defendant (who was essentially a janitor) argued that he
was not such an employee and moved to suppress evidence gathered
from the search of his locker, which flowed from the results of the drug
test.
We recruited a total of 366 judges from numerous jurisdictions
to respond to this scenario: 103 Nevada state judges, 145 Connecticut
state judges, and 65 newly elected New York state judges." Overall, we
found that the drug at issue influenced the judges' determinations, with
55% ruling against the defendant when the search had uncovered
heroin but only 44% doing so when the search had uncovered
marijuana. 72 We hypothesized that Republican judges might be less
defendant friendly and less likely to differentiate between the drugs at
issue.
Table 2B describes the results. Although we found that the
Democrats were eleven percentage points more likely to favor the
prosecution than the Republicans, 73 the difference was not significant. 74
Nor did political attitudes interact significantly with the variation in
the evidence.75
69. Wistrich et al., supra note 27, at 890-91. This scenario was adapted from one used in
Avani Mehta Sood & John M. Darley, The Plasticity of Harm in the Service of Criminalization
Goals, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1328 (2012).
70. 489 U.S. 602, 628-30 (1989).
71. We did not collect demographic data from one of the groups of judges (in Connecticut).
Hence, some of the 366 judges included in our original analysis are not included here.
72. Wistrich et al., supra note 27, at 892.
73. This trend occurred only among the Nevada judges, in which 63% (32 out of 51) of the
Democrats ruled the evidence admissible compared to 43% of their Republican counterparts (15
out of 35). Among the New York judges, Democrats and Republicans were equally likely to rule
the evidence admissible (48%, or 22 out of 46, versus 50%, or 8 out of 16).
74. Fisher's Exact Test, p = 0.23. The Cohen's d for this scenario was -0.24 (negative because
Republicans were more prodefendant than Democrats).
75. Logistic regression of the decision on party, evidence, and an interaction revealed that
the interaction was not significant (z = 0.01, p > 0.90).
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TABLE 2B: PERCENT ADMITTING EVIDENCE BY CONDITION
AND PARTY (AND N)
Condition Republicans Democrats
Marijuana 39% (31) 47% (43)
Heroin 55% (20) 63% (54)
Total 45% (51) 56% (97)
2073
C. Summary of Motions in Criminal Cases
These results were somewhat surprising. Despite the
Republican Party's reputation for being the law-and-order party,
Republican judges were no less likely than their Democratic
counterparts to rule in favor of a criminal defendant seeking to suppress
key evidence against him. In fact, the trends in the data suggested that
the opposite is true. Combining the Cohen's d among the probable cause
scenarios (0.14) with the Cohen's d in the suppression scenario (-0.24)
yielded an aggregate Cohen's d of 0.04 (weighted for sample size). This
effect was both small and clearly somewhat inconsistent.
IV. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2: CONVICTION DECISIONS
In three instances, we collected data on conviction rates among
judges asked to imagine that they were presiding over a bench trial in
which they had to determine a defendant's guilt or innocence. We
predicted that Republicans might be more likely to convict than
Democrats.
A. Battery
In a study exploring potential racial disparities, we asked three
groups of judges to decide whether they would convict in a scenario that
described a fight in a high school basketball locker room. 76 In the
scenario, the defendant pushed the plaintiff hard into a bank of lockers,
sending the victim to the hospital. The defendant claimed that he felt
threatened and was merely defending himself. We varied the race of the
76. Rachlinski et al., Unconscious Bias, supra note 27, at 1217-19 (using a vignette developed
in Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice
Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 201, 216-17
(2001)).
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defendant (half read about a white defendant and half an African
American defendant). In all cases the victim was the opposite race of
the defendant. We found no differences among the white judges based
on the race of the defendant, but we did find that the African American
judges were far more likely to convict the white defendant than the
African American defendant.77
Owing to the more sensitive nature of the materials, the three
groups of judges asked that their jurisdictions not be identified. One
hailed from a large urban jurisdiction in the eastern United States (70
judges), one from a large county in the western United States (45
judges), and the third consisted of a group of 18 judges attending a
statewide educational conference.
Among the Republicans, 84% convicted, as compared to 72% of
the Democrats. The trend was not significant, however.78 The judges'
political attitudes did not interact significantly with the race of the
defendant. 79
TABLE 3A: PERCENT CONVICTING BY PARTY AND RACE OF DEFENDANT
(AND N)
Race of Defendant Republicans Democrats
White 100% (16) 78% (51)
African American 67% (15) 66% (47)
Total 84% (31) 72% (98)
B. Armed Robbery
In an effort to study the effect of an inadmissible confession on
a judge's willingness to convict, we gave judges a scenario in which we
asked them whether they would convict a criminal defendant on trial
for robbing a bank.80 The evidence against the defendant was fairly
weak (consisting of voice recognition and some other circumstantial
evidence). We had several variations. First, the crime was either just
an armed robbery of a bank, or an armed robbery in which the
77. Id. at 1219-21 (describing results).
78. Fisher's Exact Test, p = 0.24.
79. Logistic regression of the decision on party, race, and an interaction revealed that the
interaction was not significant (z = 0, p = 0.99).
80. Rachlinski et al., Attention, supra note 27, at 1609-13.
[Vol. 70:6:20512074
JUDICIAL POLITICS AND DECISIONMAKNG
perpetrator murdered a young mother on the way out of the bank.
Second, we varied whether the defendant had confessed: one-third of
the judges saw no confession; one-third learned of a confession coerced
by mild police misconduct; and one-third learned of a confession coerced
by extreme police misconduct. The materials thus created a 2 x 3 design.
We presented this scenario at multiple judicial education
conferences to 314 judges. Our subjects were 81 federal district judges,
44 federal magistrate judges, and 101 Florida state judges (each of
whom also participated in our extended study of the hindsight bias,
reported above). Additionally, 88 judges attending a conference of
California state trial judges in May of 2006 (in Palm Springs) reviewed
this scenario.
Our experimental manipulations produced a complex pattern of
results in which the judges reacted to both the confession and the police
misconduct.81 As compared to the judges who had never learned of the
confession, those judges who read about a confession after mild police
misconduct were more likely to convict regardless of the severity of the
crime. After reading about more severe police misconduct, those judges
who reviewed the robbery were as likely to convict as those judges who
had never learned of the misconduct. The judges who read about the
severe police misconduct while evaluating the murder case, however,
were the most likely to convict among the six variations.
As Table 3B shows, we found little evidence that politics
influenced conviction rates. Across all six conditions, 42% of the
Republicans convicted as compared to 29% of the Democrats. That
difference was significant. 82 Table 3B, however, also shows that the
complex pattern we reported was largely the product of Republican
judges. The Democrats showed little variation across all six conditions.
The interaction between the presence of a confession, political attitude,
and crime was marginally significant.83 That is to say, the presence of
a confession induced the Republicans to convict more frequently (even
though the confession was not admissible), but had no effect on the
Democrats.
81. Id. at 1613-14 (describing results).
82. Fisher's Exact Test, p = 0.03.
83. A logistic regression was performed to assess the interactions that included crime;
politics; an interaction of crime and politics; the presence of any confession ("confession"); the
interaction of confession with crime; the interaction of confession with politics; the three-way
interaction of confession, crime, and politics; severe police misconduct ("severe"); an interaction
between severe and crime; an interaction between severe and politics; and the three-way
interaction of severe, crime, and politics. The interaction between confession, politics, and severe
was marginally significant (z = 1.81, p = 0.07). All other interactions were not significant (zs <
1.50, p's > 0.10).
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The interaction in these results suggests that Republicans have
misgivings about rules against the admissibility of coerced confessions.
We initially reported this pattern simply as a general trend observed
among judges, 8 4 but ideology appears to have played a critical role in
the results. Exposure to these confessions produced greater conviction
rates among Republicans, except when the crime was less serious and
the misconduct that produced the confession was very serious. In
contrast, the variations had little effect on the Democrats. Apparently,
Democrats take admissibility rules very seriously, while Republicans
harbor doubts about their wisdom, which in turn influences how they
react to coerced confessions.
TABLE 3B: PERCENT CONVICTING BY PARTY, CRIME, AND POLICE
MISCONDUCT (AND N)
Condition Republicans Democrats
Robbery No Confession 33% (18) 29% (24)
Mild Misconduct 60% (25) 32% (22)
Severe Misconduct 23% (13) 29% (31)
Total 43% (56) 30% (77)
Murder No Confession 24% (21) 21% (28)
Mild Misconduct 41% (22) 35% (26)
Severe Misconduct 54% (26) 26% (19)
Total 41% (69) 27% (73)
Total 42% (125) 29% (150)
C. Armed Robbery and Forensic Evidence
In another study, we examined judicial reactions to different
descriptions of the same forensic testimony to determine the impact of
such variations on judges' willingness to convict a criminal defendant.85
This scenario described a criminal case in which the prosecution had
84. Rachlinski et al., Attention, supra note 27, at 1614-15.
85. Id. at 1604-09.
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some weak evidence against the defendant plus some more compelling
forensic evidence. Specifically, the defendant's DNA matched that of the
perpetrator, albeit using a less diagnostic test than is often employed in
analyzing DNA evidence. We informed the judges that the likelihood
that a random adult would match was either 0.1% or one in one
thousand. Both are identical, of course, but previous research suggests
that people react differently to the two different descriptions.86 We also
varied whether the relevant population was just general, or specific to
the city in which the crime occurred.
We gave these materials to judges in Ohio and California (the
former were drawn from the same group described above in the study
of probable cause and the latter were the same group described above
in the study of the effect of confessions).87 Because we observed no
differences in conviction rates between any of the variations we tested
and none of our variations implicate political orientation, we collapsed
across our variations for this analysis.
The Republican judges were slightly more willing to convict than
the Democratic judges: 44% (42 out of 96) versus 36% (30 out of 83).
This trend was not significant, however.88
D. Summary of Conviction Decisions
All three scenarios showed a trend in which the Republicans
were more inclined to convict than the Democrats, although none of
these trends was statistically significant. Aggregating across all three
scenarios in Table 3C, however, suggests that a modest influence of
politics might be at play. Combining weighted effect sizes showed that
the Republicans were 0.29 standard errors more likely to convict than
were the Democrats.
86. See Jonathan J. Koehler, The Psychology of Numbers in the Courtroom: How to Make
DNA-Match Statistics Seem Impressive or Insufficient, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1302-03 (2001)
(finding that jurors were more impressed by evidence presented as a fraction than as a percentage
and were more impressed by a larger numerator than by a smaller one, regardless of the size of
the denominator).
87. We also gave this scenario to a third group of judges, but did not collect their political
orientation, and so exclude them from the present analysis.
88. Fisher's Exact Test, p = 0.36. Logistic regression showed that the judges' political
orientation did not interact with either of our experimental conditions, nor was the three-way
interaction significant (z's < 0.75, p's > 0.45).
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TABLE 3C: PERCENT CONVICTING BY PARTY AND SCENARIO (AND N)
Scenario Republican Democrat Republican Fisher' Cohen's d
Minus Exact
Democrat Test p-
value
Battery 84% (31) 72% (98) 12 0.24 0.39
Robbery 42% (125) 29% (150) 13 0.03 0.32
DNA 44% (96) 36% (83) 8 0.36 0.18
V. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3: SENTENCING
We have studied sentencing on several occasions. Sentencing
scenarios can also be used to investigate whether the Republican
Party's law-and-order position translates into harsher treatment of
criminal defendants among Republican judges than among Democratic
judges. Other research, in fact, has shown that in at least some settings,
Republican judges sentence more harshly than their Democratic
colleagues.8 9
A. Juveniles
The judges who reviewed the battery case described above also
reviewed the case of two juvenile defendants. 90 One of the defendants
had been convicted of shoplifting a video game and the other had been
convicted of armed robbery of a gas station. We asked the judges to
indicate how they would dispose of each case, on a seven-point scale,
with each point corresponding to a specific sentence. 9 1 We also varied
the race of the juveniles by priming the judges to think of the defendant
as white or African American. In these scenarios, the defendant's race
affected the judges' disposition (albeit only through an interaction with
a measure of implicit bias).
89. See Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review Matter? The
Case of Federal Criminal Sentencing, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 422-24 (2011) (showing that among
federal judges, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to deviate from the federal sentencing
guidelines to impose shorter sentences).
90. Rachlinski et al., Unconscious Bias, supra note 27, at 1212-13 (describing research
methodology).
91. 1 = dismissal; 2 =adjournment in contemplation of dismissal; 3 =probation for less than
six months; 4 = probation for six months to a year; 5 = confinement in a juvenile facility for less
than six months; 6 = confinement for between six months and a year; 7 = transfer to adult court.
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As Table 4A, shows, the Republicans sentenced the shoplifter to
an average 2.48 on the scale (mostly adjourning) and the armed robber
to 5.32 (mostly detention); whereas the Democrats sentenced the
juveniles to an average of 2.32 and 4.83. The Democrats seemed less
harsh, and the trend was significant in the scenario involving the armed
robber.92
TABLE 4A: AVERAGE DISPOSITION BY PARTY, SCENARIO, AND PRIME
(AND N)
Judges' political attitudes also interacted with our manipulation
of the race of the defendant. The Democratic judges were, if anything,
inclined to impose less harsh dispositions on the African American
defendant than on the white defendant, while the Republican judges
reacted in the opposite way. This trend was significant for the armed
robbery scenario. 93
The interaction suggests a potential difference between
Republican and Democratic judges on the issue of race. Factors other
than politics are unlikely explanations for this result. The result cannot
be attributed to demographic differences between the Republicans and
Democrats, as the racial makeup of the two groups did not differ much
92. t(127) = 1.02, p = 0.31 and t(127) = 2.62, p = 0.01 for the shoplifter and armed robber,
respectively.
93. F(1, 127) = 2.09, p = 0.15 and F(1, 127) = 3.95, p = 0.05 for the shoplifter and armed robber,
respectively.
Scenario and Prime Republicans Democrats
Shoplifter Neutral 2.35 (17) 2.40 (52)
African 2.64 (14) 2.22 (46)
American
Total 2.48 (31) 2.32 (98)
Robber Neutral 5.06 (17) 4.90 (52)
African 5.64 (13) 4.74 (46)
American
Total 5.32 (31) 4.83 (98)
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in our samples of judges. 94 Although the Republicans expressed a
greater degree of implicit bias than the Democrats, this divergence was
also too small to account for the different reactions of the judges. 95 The
only plausible explanation is politics: Republicans reacted to the race of
the defendant while Democrats did not. That said, the personal
bankruptcy case also tested the interaction between race and politics,
and yet we found no effect.96
B. Threatening a Judge
In an effort to study the effect of apologies on sentencing, we
asked trial judges to sentence a defendant who had threatened a fellow
judge after losing a lawsuit.97 The defendant had sent a threatening
letter to the judge who had ruled against him and included a photo of
the judge and his family taken at the beach. The defendant had written
on the photo, "I'm going to hunt you down, beat you, and kill you for
what you've done to me." The defendant was arrested and convicted of
threatening the judge. For half of the judges, the scenario described a
full apology by the defendant, which was absent from the scenario for
the other half of the judges. We asked judges to impose a sentence. We
gave this scenario to 120 Ohio judges in 2009 (who also read other
scenarios). 98 Judges who read about the apology imposed shorter
sentences than those who did not.99
As Table 4B shows, judges who identified themselves as
Republicans assigned an average sentence of 2.73 years and judges who
identified themselves as Democrats assigned an average sentence of
94. Among the Republican judges, 68% were white, 19% were African American, 6% were
Latino, and 6% were Asian. Among the Democratic judges, 64% were white, 24% were African
American, 9% were Latino, and 2% were Asian.
95. We used the Implicit Association Test ("TAT") as a measure of implicit bias, pairing white
and African American faces with positive and negative words. The full methods are described in
Rachlinski et al., Unconscious Bias, supra note 27, at 1212-13. Both Republicans and Democrats
expressed longer reaction times for the stereotype-incongruent pairings on the IAT, but the
average Republican latency was 192 milliseconds, as compared to 158 milliseconds among the
Democrats.
96. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing research methods in Rachlinski et
al., Bankruptcy, supra note 27).
97. Rachlinski et al., Contrition, supra note 27, at 1219-20.
98. U.S. military judges and Canadian judges also reviewed this scenario, but are excluded
from this analysis, as we did not ask for their political orientation. We also collected data from a
small group of federal magistrate judges, but the scenario varied for this group so as to
accommodate the federal sentencing system. Because only four of these magistrate judges
identified as Republicans, we also excluded them from the analysis.
99. Rachlinski et al., Contrition, supra note 27, at 1221-22.
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2.08 years. This difference was statistically significant.100 The effect of
the apology did not interact significantly with politics. 101
TABLE 4B: AVERAGE SENTENCE BY PARTY AND APOLOGY (AND N)
Condition Republicans Democrats
No Apology 3.23 (26) 2.56 (25)
Apology 2.40 (40) 1.50 (21)
Total 2.73 (66) 2.08 (46)
C. Immigration
Immigration divides the political parties. Republicans tend to
support tighter border security while Democrats tend to be more
accommodating to immigration. The divide is at its deepest when it
comes to views on crime and immigration.102 We would thus expect that
if politics influences how judges decide criminal cases, then a case
involving an immigrant would produce the largest difference between
Republican and Democratic judges.
As part of our study of emotional influence on judges, we created
a scenario involving an individual who had entered the United States
illegally from Peru and was arrested. 103 The materials indicated that
the individual entered the United States using a genuine Peruvian
passport and a forged visa he had acquired in Peru. The materials
stated that he was arrested, charged with illegally entering the United
States, and was being deported. The prosecutor, however, wanted to
add an additional allegation so that the defendant would serve more
time before his deportation. In the federal system, this consisted of the
100. t(110) = 2.47, p = 0.02.
101. ANOVA with main effects of party and apology, which revealed that the interaction was
not significant. F(1, 111) = 0.20, p = 0.65.
102. Stephanos Bibas, Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Policing Politics at
Sentencing, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1371, 1378 (2009) (discussing empirical findings that Republican
judges tended to sentence criminals more harshly than their Democratic counterparts); Rebecca
Sharpless, Immigrants are Not Criminals: Respectability, Immigration Reform, and
Hyperincarceration, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 691, 701-04 (2016) (discussing approaches utilized by law
reformers on either end of the political spectrum regarding immigration reform); see also Wide
Partisan Divide Over Immigration Restrictions, PEW RES. CTR. (June 19, 2012),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2012/06/19/wide-partisan-divide-over-immigration-
restrictions/ [https://perma.ccVFB5-EWN8] (reporting that 84% of Republicans, but just 58% of
Democrats, believe that the United States should impose tighter restrictions on immigration).
103. Wistrich et al., supra note 27, at 876-77.
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prosecutor asking for a sentence enhancement under the federal
sentencing guidelines for using a forged document in the commission of
a crime. For the state judges this consisted of adding an additional
charge of forgery of an identification document (namely, his passport).
The defendant moved to have the forgery allegation disregarded,
arguing that he did not forge his identification document, but merely
pasted a forged item onto it. The prosecutor argued that he satisfied the
elements of forgery of an identification document by pasting a false
document into the genuine passport. The materials then indicated that
the matter was one of first impression and asked the judge for a ruling.
Our materials varied one aspect of the scenario. For half of the
judges, the immigrant was a father, who wanted to work in the United
States to earn money to care for his seriously ill daughter. For the other
half of the judges, the immigrant was in the United States to track down
an individual who had stolen proceeds from a drug cartel. We presented
these materials to 508 judges in six groups: 64 newly appointed U.S.
magistrate judges; 36 federal court judges serving in the Ninth Circuit
who were attending a judicial training conference; 80 state and federal
appellate judges attending a national conference in Orlando; 86 newly
appointed New York trial judges; and 242 Ohio judges. The judges were
more likely to rule against the defendant identified as being involved
with drug gangs than as a father. 10 4
Politics influenced the judges' rulings in this scenario. Across all
groups and the two conditions, 56% of the Republicans and 47% of the
Democrats ruled against the defendant. This difference was marginally
significant.105 Table 4C-1 shows that the Republicans were only slightly
less motivated by sympathy than the Democrats. The interaction
between party and condition was not significant. 106
104. Id. at 877-80.
105. Fisher's Exact Test, p = 0.09.
106. Logistic regression of the decision on party, identity of the defendant, and an interaction
revealed that the interaction was not significant (z = 0.45, p = 0.65).
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TABLE 4C-1: PERCENT RULING AGAINST THE DEFENDANT BY PARTY AND
CONDITION (AND N)
Among the two groups of federal judges, we also asked for a
sentence. We provided judges with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
recommendations, which varied depending upon their ruling on the
issue of forgery. Judges who ruled in favor of the defendant sentenced
within the Guidelines range of 0-6 months and those who ruled against
the defendant sentenced within the Guidelines range of 6-12 months.
Table 4C-2 below provides the averages by party. Overall, the
Republicans sentenced somewhat more harshly, but neither party nor
any interaction term was significant. 107
TABLE 4C-2: AVERAGE SENTENCE BY PARTY, CONDITION, AND RULING
(AND N)
Condition Republicans Democrats
Father 47% (98) 41% (116)
Killer 64% (105) 53% (122)
Total 56% (203) 47% (238)
Condition Republicans Democrats
Father Favor 3.8 (6) 2.6 (13)
Disfavor 5.8 (4) 4.8 (16)
Killer Favor 6.0 (3) 4.9 (14)
Disfavor 8.6 (7) 7.9 (21)
Total 6.2 (20) 5.4 (64)
107. ANOVA with main effects of party, identity of defendant, judge's ruling, and all
interactions revealed F(1, 76) = 2.41, p = 0.13 for the main effect and all interaction terms Fs
below 0.10, p's > 0.80.
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D. Truth in Sentencing
Several jurisdictions have adopted statutes that require judges
be informed of the cost to the state of a criminal sentence before they
impose it.108 This reform is intended to reduce sentences. To determine
whether this reform actually has that effect, we created a sentencing
scenario for judges.1 09 We varied the crime: in one case it was possession
of a controlled substance (a nonviolent offense that should merit a
relatively modest sentence), and in the other a brutal sexual assault.
We also varied the information about the cost of incarceration,
providing either no information, information suggesting the cost was
fairly low ($15,000 per year), or information suggesting the cost was
fairly high ($31,000 per year).
We gave this scenario to a group of 133 trial judges attending
the American Judges' Association conference in Denver. These judges
hailed from over two dozen different states. We found, paradoxically,
that providing information about the cost of the sentence had no effect
on the minor crime, but a big effect on the sexual assault case. In the
latter, judges were cost sensitive and imposed shorter sentences when
the materials indicated that the cost was high.
Politics had little effect on the sentences in this study. As Table
4D shows, Republicans sentenced the drug offender to 2.5 years, as
compared to 2.9 years among the Democrats. In the sexual assault case,
Republicans sentenced the defendant to 12.9 years, on average, as
opposed to 15.4 years among the Democrats. In effect, the Democrats
tended to sentence more harshly, although neither difference was
significant." 0 Although Table 4D reveals a tendency for Republicans to
be more cost sensitive than Democrats, the interaction between politics
and the experimental variation in cost information was not significant
in either case."'
108. Rachlinski et al., Attention, supra note 27, at 1592-93.
109. Id. at 1594-95.
110. In the drug case, t(53) = 0.61, p = 0.31, and in the sexual assault case, t(55) = 1.42, p =
0.16.
111. ANOVA with main effects of party and information on sentence cost, which revealed that
the interaction was not significant: F(2, 49) = 1.67, p = 0.20 for the drug case, and F(2, 51) = 0.88,
p = 0.42 in the sexual assault case. The sample of Republicans was modest, especially once they
were divided into three conditions. Thus, our ability to detect any interaction was weak.
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TABLE 4D: AVERAGE SENTENCE BY PARTY,
INFORMATION (AND N)
CRIME, AND COST
E. Manslaughter Case
In a study using the same judges as in the truth-in-sentencing
experiment, we tested the influence of scaling on sentencing decisions.
That is, we asked judges to sentence a defendant who had been
convicted of manslaughter either using months or years.1 12 The
materials provided details concerning the crime and the defendant's
background and criminal history. We found, surprisingly, that judges
imposed sentences that were 40% shorter when using months than
when using years.
As Table 4E shows, Republicans and Democrats imposed
roughly identical sentences, on average. 113 The interaction between
party and scale was also not significant. 114
Condition Republicans Democrats
Drug None 2.4 (5) 1.9 (8)
Low 1.8(11) 3.4(11)
High 4.5(4) 3.0(16)
Total 2.5 (20) 2.9 (35)
Rape None 15.9 (7) 16.8 (12)
Low 18.0 (3) 16.9 (13)
High 8.5(8) 15.4(14)
Total 12.9 (18) 15.4 (39)
112. Rachlinski et al., Numeric Judgments, supra note 27, at 714-15.
113. t(110) = 0.10, p = 0.92.
114. ANOVA with main effects of party and scale, which revealed that their interaction was
not significant. F(1, 107) = 0.01, p > 0.9.
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TABLE 4E: AVERAGE SENTENCE (IN YEARS) BY PARTY AND CONDITION
(AND N)
F. Sentencing Two Defendants
Does the order in which defendants are sentenced influence
judges' sentences? We hypothesized that judges might anchor their
sentences to the sentence they had imposed in the previous case. To test
this we asked state trial judges in Arizona, military judges, and Dutch
judges to sentence two defendants back to back: one convicted of
threatening with a weapon and the other with manslaughter. 115 We did
not ask the military (or Dutch) judges to identify their political
orientation, so we only analyze the 39 Arizona judges here. We found
that the order influenced judges: when sentencing the lesser crime first,
the judges imposed shorter sentences for the more serious crime; when
they sentenced the more serious crime first, they imposed longer
sentences on the lesser crime.
As Table 4F shows, politics seemed not to influence the judges.
The average sentence imposed by Republicans was nearly identical to
that imposed by Democrats. 116 The interaction between party and order
was not significant in the threat case,117 but a trend for an interaction
emerged in the manslaughter case. The Democrats seemed to be
influenced by anchoring in that they imposed shorter sentences on the
manslaughter defendant after sentencing the defendant in the less
serious case. Republicans, however, showed the opposite trend. The
interaction of sentence order and political party approached
significance.11 8
115. Rachlinski et al., Numeric Judgments, supra note 27, at 727-29.
116. The differences were not significant. For the threat case, t(35) = 0.93, p = 0.36, and for
the manslaughter case, t(35) = 0.22, p = 0.83.
117. ANOVA with main effects of party and order, which revealed that their interaction was
not significant. F(1, 33) = 1.33, p = 0.25.
118. F(1, 33) = 2.80, p = 0.10.
Condition Republicans Democrats
Months 5.7 (18) 5.6 (32)
Years 9.5 (20) 9.4 (42)
Total 7.7 (38) 7.8 (74)
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TABLE 4F: AVERAGE SENTENCE BY PARTY, CRIME, AND CONDITION
(AND N)
Condition Republicans Democrats
Threat Threat 1st 0.50 (7) 0.56 (9)
Threat 0.95 (10) 0.70 (11)
2nd
Total 0.76 (17) 0.64 (20)
Manslaughter Threat 1st 8.5 (7) 9.4 (9)
Threat 9.6 (10) 8.7 (11)
2nd
Total 9.1 (17) 9.0 (20)
We have no theory as to why the Democrats reacted differently
to our experimental manipulation. When sentencing for the more
serious crime, the Republicans expressed a contrast effect,119 in which
sentencing the less serious case made the more serious case look worse,
while Democrats expressed an anchoring effect. The prospect that
judges of different political orientations exhibit different approaches to
sequential sentencing is intriguing, if unexplained. Given the small
sample size, however, and the fact that the trend only approached
significance, it could simply be an aberration. That said, we also
observed a difference in how numeric anchors influenced Republicans
and Democrats in one of the civil damage scenarios, which is described
below. 120
G. Summary of Sentencing
Across nine different sentencing scenarios, two produced a
statistically reliable difference based on the political ideology of the
judges-the threat to a judge and the juvenile robbery-and one a
marginally significant effect-the immigration scenario. Two showed
119. The contrast effect consists of improving the evaluation of a target by the addition of an
inferior distractor. See Rachlinski et al., Attention, supra note 27, at 1597 (describing the contrast
effect). We have found that in some contexts, judges exhibit a contrast effect. Id. at 1597-1604; see
also Adi Leibovitch, Punishing on a Curve, 11 Nw. U. L. REV. 1205 (2017) (showing that trial judges
in Pennsylvania exhibit a contrast effect in sentencing decisions).
120. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
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trends in the opposite direction and the rest were close, but on average,
the Republicans sentenced more severely. Overall, the combined results
show an aggregated weighted (by sample size) Cohen's d of 0.19. The
result is similar to that of criminal verdicts. In effect, the Republican
judges sentenced defendants to one-fifth of a standard deviation more
than Democrats.
TABLE 4G: AVERAGE SENTENCING RESULTS BY PARTY AND SCENARIO
(AND N)
Scenario Republican Democrat Republican p-value Cohen's
Minus d
Democrat
Juvenile 2.48 (31) 2.30 (98) 0.18 0.31 0.18
Shoplifting*
Juvenile 5.32 (31) 4.83 (98) 0.49 0.05 0.46
Robbery*
Threat to 2.73 years 2.08 years (46) 0.65 0.02 0.47
Judge (66)
Immigration 56% (203) 47% (238) 9% 0.09 0.20
Drug 2.5 years 2.9 years (35) -0.4 0.31 -0.16
(20)
Rape 12.9 years 15.4 years (39) -2.5 0.16 -0.38
(18)
Manslaughter 7.7 years 7.8 years (74) -0.1 0.92 -0.02
(38)
Threat 0.8 years 0.6 years (20) 0.2 0.36 0.31
(17)
Manslaughter 9.1 years 9.0 years (20) 0.1 0.83 0.07
(17)
* On a seven-point scale
VI. CIVIL CASES
Civil justice issues have their own political cast. The two major
parties take different approaches to civil justice, with Republicans
persistently calling for limitations on tort liability, which Democrats
consistently oppose. This division has spilled over into judicial politics.
In Texas in the early 1990s, for example, business interests began
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backing candidates for the Texas Supreme Court whom they felt were
less amenable to the interests of injured tort plaintiffs. 121 To be sure,
the outcome of civil cases would not necessarily have a political cast.
Political attitudes of the judges are, for example, unlikely to influence
most lawsuits between businesses. But many areas of law implicate
political attitudes. We have conducted several experiments in which we
requested that judges provide damage awards and report them below.
A. Civil Rights
A lawsuit involving a constitutional violation would seem likely
to divide judges along political fault lines. Republican politicians tend
to disfavor lawsuits against the government, particularly when they are
directed at law enforcement. Judicial decisions might reflect this
attitude as well.
A scenario that we gave to 231 Minnesota judges tests this
concern. The materials described a lawsuit by an individual challenging
a blanket strip search policy adopted by a municipality's jail. 122 The
plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the policy. 12 3 We varied two
aspects of the case. First, the plaintiff was identified either as a person
accused of armed robbery ("thug"), who had a lengthy criminal record,
or a female student ("coed") who had been arrested while protesting
tuition increases at her college. Second, the plaintiff brought the suit
either for injunctive relief or as a class action. The decision is essentially
the same in all conditions, in that any ruling in favor of the plaintiff
would end the jail's policy. We nevertheless found that the judges were
more favorably disposed to the coed than the thug, although less so
when the case was identified as a class action. 124
As Table 5A shows, Republicans and Democrats did not differ in
their analysis of this case. Among the Republicans, 61% granted the
121. See Sam Gwynne et al., Tort Reform in Texas: 'Rove's Genius at Work," PBS: FRONTLINE
(Apr. 12, 2005), http://www.pbs.org/wgbhlpages/frontline/shows/architect/texas/tort.html
[https://perma.cc/5R6B-NY5V] (discussing the factors and forces motivating tort reform efforts in
Texas).
122. Wistrich et al., supra note 27, at 883-85.
123. At the time we conducted this study, the issue was governed by the holding in Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538-39 (1979), which held that the constitutional rights of prisoners could
be restricted based on only legitimate institutional needs and objectives. Subsequently, the
Supreme Court altered its approach in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 330-
35 (2012), holding that even persons arrested for minor offenses or traffic violations may be subject
to a strip search before being introduced into the general population of a jail.
124. When the case was brought as an individual proceeding, 84% of the judges assessing the
suit by the coed found in her favor, as opposed to only 50% for the thug. When the case was brought
as a class action, the gap narrowed to 65% and 51%, respectively. Wistrich et al., supra note 27, at
885.
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plaintiff relief, as compared to 64% of the Democrats. This difference
was not significant. 125 Although Table 5A reveals a few minor variations
(with a notably low rate of finding for the plaintiff among the
Republicans reviewing the thug suing individually), a full analysis
revealed that these are illusory-none of these interactions were
significant. 12 6
TABLE 5A: PERCENT RULING FOR THE PLAINTIFF BY PARTY AND
CONDITION (AND N)
B. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages also divide the political parties. Republicans
tend to view them as unnecessary and typically unreasonably high, or
at least erratic, while Democrats view the availability of punitive
damages as a necessary constraint on business excesses. In actuality,
punitive damages are typically only awarded for intentional torts, such
as fraud or battery,127 but the potential for awards in business cases
nevertheless inspires concern that is perhaps disproportionate to their
impact.
To evaluate the role of politics in judicial determinations of
punitive damages, we analyzed a scenario in which we asked judges to
125. Fisher's Exact Test, p = 0.71.
126. This analysis was conducted with a logistic regression on party, identity of the plaintiff,
procedure, all two-way interactions, and the three-way interaction. The interaction between party
and the identity of the plaintiff was not significant (z = 0.63, p = 0.52); the interaction between
party and form of either lawsuit was also not significant (z = 1.38, p = 0.17); and finally the three-
way interaction between party, identity of the defendant, and form of the lawsuit was not
significant (z = 0.89, p = 0.37).
127. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical
Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 749 tbl.1 (2002) (reporting that punitive damages tend to be
awarded mostly in cases of intentional torts).
Condition Republicans Democrats
Injunction Thug 33% (12) 55% (29)
Coed 86% (14) 88% (32)
Class Thug 54% (13) 43% (35)
Action
Coed 67% (12) 70% (37)
Total 61% (51) 64% (133)
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consider awarding punitive damages to an injured plaintiff in a
business setting.128 Our scenario described a midsized company in
which the owner (and CEO) dumped hazardous waste in a nearby lake,
rather than pay to have it disposed of properly. The materials indicated
that the lake was on a farm owned by the plaintiff, who was badly
injured when he was exposed to the chemicals while swimming. The
materials asked judges whether an award of punitive damages was
appropriate, and if so how much they would award. 129 Our primary
interest in this scenario was whether judges would treat an out-of-state
litigant differently than an in-state litigant. Hence, we varied the
defendant's state of residence. The judges awarded punitive damages to
a plaintiff from their state against either an out-of-state defendant or
an in-state defendant. We gave this scenario to state judges from
Minnesota (115), Ohio (116), and New Jersey (157).130 Judges punished
the out-of-state defendant more harshly than the in-state defendant.131
Although the data show a trend for Democrats to award more
than Republicans, this trend was not significant. 132 Nor did the effect of
politics interact with the defendant's home state.133
128. Wistrich et al., supra note 27, at 894-95.
129. All but 21 of 371 judges who answered this question agreed that punitive damages were
appropriate. We scored these judges as if they had awarded $0. Id. at 896.
130. In Minnesota and Ohio, the plaintiff was from Minnesota and Ohio, respectively, while
the defendant was from Wisconsin (for Minnesota judges) or Michigan (for Ohio judges). Hence the
lawsuit was either a wholly in-state matter, or was targeted against an out-of-state defendant by
an in-state plaintiff. In New Jersey, the lawsuit was either by a New Jersey plaintiff against a
Pennsylvania defendant, or by a Pennsylvania plaintiff against a New Jersey defendant. Id. at
895-96.
131. Id. at 897.
132. Using the Mann-Whitney U test, z = 1.33, p = 0.18. Damage awards tend to be positively
skewed, violating statistical assumptions of normality, and our data are no exception. In all cases
of damage awards in this Article, we conduct a nonparametric test on the main effect of party,
using the Mann-Whitney U test. We also transformed the awards using the square root to perform
parametric tests. We follow this procedure for all cases involving damage awards. The transformed
averages of these two groups did not differ significantly. t(304) = 1.41, p = 0.16.
133. ANOVA with main effects of party, defendant's location, and their interaction on the
square root of the awards revealed that the interaction was not significant. F(1, 286) = 1.12, p
0.60.
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TABLE 5B: MEDIAN AWARD BY PARTY, STATE, AND CONDITION (AND N),
IN $1,OOOs
Condition Republicans Democrats
Minnesota In state $1,000 (12) $1,000 (29)
Out of state $1,000 (16) $2,000 (31)
Ohio In state $1,000 (22) $1,000 (31)
Out of state $1,000 (18) $1,250 (24)
New Jersey In state $1,500 (32) $1,000 (30)
Out of state $1,500 (17) $2,000 (45)
Total $1,000 (117) $1,500 (190)
C. Tort Injury #1
As part of our effort to determine whether judges can reliably
assign damage awards, we crafted a personal-injury scenario in which
a package-delivery truck injured a plaintiff in a traffic accident. 134 The
scenario described moderate injuries, which we intended to be worth
roughly $50,000. For half of the judges, the scenario also stated that a
new damage cap of $750,000 applied to the case, as an effort to test
whether this cap would have the paradoxical effect of pulling damage
awards upwards. We gave the scenario to 65 newly elected New York
State judges and found that it did.13 5
Table 5C shows that the median award among Republicans was
$100,000, as compared to $150,000 among Democrats. This difference,
however, was not significant. 136
134. Rachlinski et al., Numeric Judgments, supra note 27, at 721-23.
135. Id. at 722.
136. Using the Mann-Whitney U test, z= 0.52, p = .60. The transformed data likewise showed
no significant effect. t(304) = 0.90, p = 0.37.
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TABLE 5C: MEDIAN AWARD BY PARTY AND CONDITION (AND N), IN
THOUSANDS ($)
Condition Republicans Democrats
No Damage Cap $100 (9) $50 (19)
Damage Cap $75 (7) $250 (22)
Total $100 (16) $150 (41)
As Table 5C suggests, the damage cap had a different effect on
Republicans than on Democrats. The damage cap notably increased the
awards among the Democratic judges, but had essentially no effect on
the Republicans. The difference between the two reactions was
significant. 137 The result is puzzling. Although one might suspect that
the Republicans in New York might think of the cap as a signal to
reduce their awards, damage caps can operate as numeric anchors.
Even anchors that people think of as uninformative influence
judgment, 138 so the cap should have influenced the Republicans and
Democrats alike. And yet it did not.
D. Tort Injury #2
Having found in many studies that even arbitrary numeric
estimates influence judges, we sought to study whether we could
inoculate judges against the pernicious influence of anchoring. We used
a scenario similar to the one we used in the Tory Injury #1 experiment,
although we described a much more severe injury, meant to be worth
nearly seven figures.139 To create an anchoring effect, the scenario
stated that the plaintiff testified that he had recently seen a tort victim
win an award on "a court television show." The plaintiff either testified
that he had seen the victim win a small award, no award, or a huge
award. We collected this data with a group of 242 Ohio trial judges.
Previous research showed that this manipulation had a large influence
on judges, 140 and the same occurred in this replication. For half of the
judges, we also added an inoculant (a description of other, more
137. ANOVA with main effects of party damage cap, and an interaction revealed that the
interaction was significant. F(1, 53) = 6.14, p = 0.02.
138. Rachlinski et al., Numeric Judgments, supra note 27, at 702-03 (reviewing that even
absurd numeric reference points influence numeric judgments).
139. Id. at 731-33.
140. Guthrie et al., supra note 18, at 1502-06.
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reasonable tort awards) meant to blunt the influence of the anchor. The
inoculant was partly successful, although it increased awards overall.
Table 5D describes the results, broken down by the six
conditions. Although the Democrats awarded more than the
Republicans, this trend only approached significance. 14 1 The judges'
political attitudes did not interact with the anchor, the inoculant, or the
interaction of the two. 1 4 2
TABLE 5D: AVERAGE AWARD BY PARTY AND CONDITION (AND N), IN
THOUSANDS ($)
Condition Republicans Democrats
No Inoculant Low Anchor $560 (25) $275 (8)
No Anchor $750 (18) $600 (14)
High Anchor $1,000 (15) $1,000 (15)
Inoculant Low Anchor $750 (24) $750 (16)
No Anchor $1,000 (23) $1,525 (12)
High Anchor $1,000 (23) $1,200 (15)
Total $750 (128) $1,000 (80)
This study failed to replicate the interaction between party and
anchor we found in the Tort Injury #1 experiment. That suggests either
that the previous results are anomalous or that the interaction was a
product of the source of the anchor-which was damage caps in the
previous study and irrelevant testimony in this study.
E. Tort Injury #3
As part of an effort to examine the effect of apologies on judges,
we created a scenario in which a plaintiff was injured when a defendant
pulled a lawn chair out from under her as she was about to sit down. 143
141. Using the Mann-Whitney U test, z = 1.46, p= 0.14. The transformed data likewise showed
no main effect. t(207) = 1.38, p = 0.17.
142. ANOVA with the main effects of party, anchor, inoculant, and all interactions revealed
that none of the interactions were significant: party by anchor, F(2, 196) = 0.81, p = 0.45; party by
inoculant, F(1, 196) = 1.24, p = 0.27; the three-way interaction, F(2, 196) = 0.15, p = 0.86.
143. Rachlinski et al., Contrition, supra note 27, at 1212-13.
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The scenario varied whether the plaintiff apologized to the victim or
not, and whether the plaintiffs actions were intentional (as a prank) or
merely negligent (due to intoxication). We found little influence of
either variation among the 101 Florida trial judges who reviewed this
scenario. 144
Table 5E reports the results, broken down by condition. It shows
little influence of politics. The overall median award was identical
between the two groups of judges, 145 and no interactions between
political attitudes and conditions were significant. 146
TABLE 5E: MEDIAN AWARD BY PARTY AND CONDITION (AND N), IN
THOUSANDS ($)
Condition Republicans Democrats
Negligent No Apology $175 (12) $250 (7)
Apology $50 (6) $100 (7)
Intentional No Apology $125 (12) $100 (8)
Apology $175 (8) $150 (11)
Total $100 (43) $100 (33)
F. Tort Injury #4
In a further effort to study the influence of apologies on trial
judges, we wrote a products liability scenario involving a plaintiff
injured by a defective saw. 14 7 The materials indicated that the CEO of
the manufacturer either apologized or did not at a settlement
conference. We gave this scenario to 124 U.S. magistrate judges and
district judges at a series of four conferences. We asked the judges to
suggest an appropriate settlement for damages to compensate the
plaintiff for pain and suffering.
As Table 5F below shows, the judges' political attitudes had little
effect on their awards. The median award among Democrats was
144. Id. at 1213.
145. Using the Mann-Whitney U test, z = 0.22, p = 0.83. The transformed data are also not
significant. t(74) = 1.03, p = 0.30.
146. ANOVA on the square root with main effect of party, intention, apology, and all
interactions revealed that no effects were significant (Fs < 1.00, p's > 0.30).
147. Rachlinski et al., Contrition, supra note 27, at 1209-30.
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$50,000 higher than that of Republicans, but that difference was not
significant, although there was a marginally significant trend on the
transformed data.148 Although the medians were identical, the full
range among the Republicans seemed more compressed than among the
Democrats. The 25th percentile award among the Republicans was
$100,000 as compared to $150,000 among the Democrats, and the 75th
percentile award was $500,000 among the Republicans as compared to
$750,000 among the Democrats. The interaction between the apology
and the judge's political orientation was not significant. 149
TABLE 5F: MEDIAN AWARD BY PARTY AND CONDITION (AND N), IN
THOUSANDS ($)
G. Summary of Civil Cases
As presented in Table 5G, across all six civil cases, Democrats
favored the plaintiffs more than Republicans did. None of the scenarios
demonstrated a significant effect of political attitude on awards,
although one yielded a marginally significant effect. Aggregating across
all of the six scenarios suggests a modest effect.
Despite a series of null results, the overall pattern supports the
view that Democrats are more inclined to rule in favor of plaintiffs than
are Republicans. The average effect size weighted by sample size across
the six scenarios was 0.20 (Cohen's d). In essence, the Democrats
awarded one-fifth of a standard error more in damages than
Republicans across the scenarios.
Condition Republicans Democrats
No Apology $250 (25) $200 (35)
Apology $350 (24) $300 (32)
Total $250 (49) $250 (67)
148. Using the Mann-Whitney U test, z = 1.33, p = 0.18. The transformed data show a
marginally significant trend. t(74) = 1.92, p = 0.06.
149. F(1, 112) = 0.10, p = 0.75.
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TABLE 5G: MEDIAN AWARDS BY PARTY AND SCENARIO (AND N) IN
THOUSANDS ($)
Scenario Republican Democrat Democrat p-value* Cohen's d
Minus
Republican
Civil 61% (51) 64% (123) 3% 0.71 0.07
Rights**
Punitive $1000 (117) $1500 $500 0.16 0.16
Damages (190)
Tort Injury $100 (16) $100 (41) $0 0.37 0.24
#1: Damage
Cap
Tort Injury $750 (128) $1000 (80) $250 0.17 0.19
#2: Debiasing
Tort Injury $100 (43) $100 (33) $0 0.30 0.24
#3: BBQ
Tort Injury $250 (49) $250 (67) $0 0.06 0.45
#4: Handsaw
*Reports the Fisher's Exact Test for the civil rights case,
the transformed awards for the other scenarios.
** Percent finding for plaintiff
and the result of the t-tests on
CONCLUSION
In our research to date, political attitudes have exhibited a weak
effect on judicial decisionmaking. Although some of our experiments
revealed a tendency for judges to decide cases in a manner consistent
with their political ideology, only a handful yielded statistically reliable
differences. The aggregated results for bankruptcy judges, for
conviction decisions, for sentencing, and for civil damage awards were
all modest. Somewhat surprisingly, political ideology did not affect the
judges' resolution of criminal pretrial motions. Thus, these results
dovetail reasonably well with those of political scientists. But the effect
of political ideology we observed was uneven and generally quite
modest, thereby suggesting that the influence of political ideology on
trial court judges is small.
Given the modest effect we found, it is not surprising that judges
do not detect the role of political ideology in their decisionmaking. Only
when large numbers of decisions are aggregated does the impact of
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political ideology become clear. Furthermore, our materials might
exaggerate the effect of political ideology because we crafted the
scenarios so as to produce close cases. Most cases might be much easier,
further diluting any influence of political ideology. The variations in
cases that should affect their results likewise are apt to hide any
influence of political orientation on judges. When judges search their
experience for evidence of the influence of their political attitudes, it is
small wonder that they find little support.
Is the level of political influence present in these data a
worrisome source of inequity in the courtroom? We think not. It is a
modest effect that is likely swamped by normatively appropriate factors
in most circumstances. The psychological phenomena that these
scenarios were designed to assess exerted more influence on the judges
than their political orientation did. Judges are human beings with
political attitudes, but the facts and law presented in individual cases
are a much bigger influence on their judgment.
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APPENDIX A: DEMOGRAPHICS
This appendix reports the demographic characteristics of the
judges who participated in this research, broken out by section of the
paper. In all cases, we report the percentage of judges who identified
themselves as Republicans, along with the number of judges who
answered the question on politics. Judges who identified themselves as
"independent" or "neither" are scored as missing data. We also report
the percentage who were female and the number who answered that
question. Finally, we report the average years of experience and
number who answered that question; for new judges (New York), we did
not ask about experience and report it as zero.
TABLE Al: BANKRUPTCY JUDGES
Scenario Judges (and n) % Republican % Female Experience
Cramdown Bankruptcy Judges, 23 27 11.0
2004 (113)
Student Loan
Credit Card v1
Credit Card v2 Bankruptcy Judges, 23 37 11.2
2013 (201)
Personal
Bankruptcy
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TABLE A2: CRIMINAL MOTIONS
[Vol. 70:6:2051
Scenario Judges (and n) % Republican % Female Average
Years of
Experience
Probable Ohio, 2009* 62 20 14.2
Cause; Rock (130)
Concert
Probable Federal 57 22 11.3
Cause; Injured district judges,
Driver 2004 (81)**
Federal 15 21 10.0
magistrate
judges, 2004
(43)
Florida, 2004 56 21 14.4
(101)
Probable Florida, 2006 58 23 13.7
Cause; Feeing (154)
Suspect
Search and Nevada (103) 41 42 9.3
Seizure Case
New York (65) 26 35 New (0)
* This scenario was given to half of the judges in attendance; demographics
reported herein reflect the entire sample.
** These judges attended one of three educational conferences organized by the
Federal Judicial Center in Philadelphia (27 judges), Chicago (16 judges), or
Seattle (38 federal district judges and 1 federal magistrate judge), all in 2004.
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TABLE A3: CONVICTION RATES
Scenario Judges (and n) % % Average
Republican Female Years of
Experience
Battery Eastern city, 2005 13 44 9.8
(70)
Western county, 36 33 10.8
2006 (45)
State-wide 35 50 9.3
conference, 2007 (18)
Robbery* California, 2006 (88) 41 28 10.5
DNA See Table A2, (Ohio - -
2009 and California
2006)
* Federal district court judges, federal magistrate judges,
reported in Table A2 above also participated in this study.
and Florida (2004) judges
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TABLE A4: SENTENCING
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Scenario Judges (and n) % Republican % Female Average
Years of
Experience
Juveniles See Table A3, - - -
Battery
Threat Ohio, 2009 (120)* 62 20 14.2
Immigration Federal magistrate 128 30 New
judges, 2009, 2010
(64)
Ninth Circuit trial 15 47 10.7
judges, San Diego,
2008 (36)
Appellate judges, 38 25 Not available
Orlando 2009 (80)
New York, 2010, 30 31 New
2014 (86)
Ohio, 2009 (242) 62 20 14.2
Drug & Rape Denver, 2010 (133) 33 29 13.0
Manslaughter Denver, 2010 (133) 33 29 13.0
Threat & Arizona, 2011 (39) 46 39 11.5
Manslaughter
* This scenario was given to half of the judges in attendance; demographics reported
herein reflect the entire sample.
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TABLE A5: CIVIL CASES
2103
Scenario Judges (and n) % Republican % Female Average
Years of
Experience
Civil Rights Minnesota, 2010 28 28 13.8
(231)
Punitive Minnesota, 2010 32 29 13.8
Damages (115)
Ohio, 2013 (116) 41 53 13.0
New Jersey, 2011 39 26 12.4
(157)
Tort #1 New York 2013 (65) 26 35 New
Tort #2 Ohio, 2009 (242) 62 20 14.2
Tort #3 Florida, 2004 (101). - - -
See Table A2
Tort #4 Federal district
judges, 2004 (81).
See Table A2
Federal magistrate -
judges, 2004 (43).
See Table A2
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